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1Understanding the Role of Incomplete and
Asymmetric Information in a Multi-Asset Market
Abstract
This paper continues Admati (1985)’s study of multi-asset model to the case
where the payoﬀs for each asset are generated by two underlying factors. This
framework allows us to study the eﬀectiveness of incomplete information. A ra-
tional expectations equilibrium can be obtained in a closed-form solution for some
important special cases. We show when the equilibrium prices depend on the
two payoﬀs, but with diﬀerent coeﬃcients. This model produces a check-shape
relationship between price changes and trading volume, which is consistent with
empirical evidence. Furthermore, this model draws many other unique conclu-
sions. For example, high stock prices need not be associated with high realizations
in fundamentals; the same asset can be viewed as a Giﬀen good by some agents
and a normal good by others; asset prices can have weak correlations with their
fundamentals; and the model can generate high price volatilities and large risk
premiums.
Key Words: Asymmetric Information, Correlation, Multi-Asset, Multiple Fun-
damentals, Incomplete Information, Risk Premium, TradingVolume, Volatility.1 Introduction
In recent years, the U.S. has experienced several periods during which there were an
enormous changes in stock prices over short time windows. The 1987 stock market crash,
where the stock market fell by almost 20 percent in a single day, was the most dramatic
example of such a case. Economists are still trying to rationalize and to understand such
phenomena. Is it due to sudden changes in the fundamentals or due to changes in investor
sentiment? Can information asymmetry play a role in understanding the phenomenon?
Certainly from an ex-post perspective and with suﬃcient historical data, one might be
able to tell signiﬁcant changes in fundamentals. On the other hand, several studies
also point out that information plays a crucial role even when fundamental changes
are signiﬁcant. Among the popular asymmetric information models, the informed and
uninformed traders’ models are important and oﬀer useful insights. However, there
is no clear borderline between the informed and the uninformed investors in reality.
Sometimes even insiders can have projections about their own ﬁrms that prove to be
totally unrealistic. On the other hand, outsiders sometimes can follow the market and
form their expectations in a more objective and dispassionate manner. This suggests
that investors may actually possess information about diﬀerent aspects of fundamentals.
This view can also be justiﬁed from the perspective of a factor model. If there are several
factors that determine stock returns, in the context of an asymmetric information model,
the factors can be interpreted as diﬀerent underlying forces generating separate payoﬀs
for each stock, since agents are not homogeneous. It is also possible that agents may
have simply received diﬀerent information (or signals) on the same stock. In any case, it
would be useful to build a model that explores this incomplete informational structure1,
instead of assuming informational advantages of some agents over the others. Such a
framework will allow us not only to study the role of each single information set but also
to investigate information incompleteness. As a result, an information revealing process
in equilibrium prices should be much richer than a conventional model. At the same
time, many of the implications can be directly tied to observed phenomena.
Based on these premises, we build an incomplete information model that extends
Admati (1985)’s work. Speciﬁcally, we introduce multiple factors or “fundamentals”
1In game theory, for example, incomplete information refers to the uncertainty about some players’
payoﬀ functions.
3for each asset in a multi-asset model. This generalization is signiﬁcant in the sense
that it not only broadens the structure of asset returns, but also creates an incomplete
information structure2, where no agent of either group has complete knowledge about
the overall fundamentals.
We work with a static model throughout the paper for the following reasons. In a
dynamic setting, where information is incomplete and not ranked, agents will face an
“inﬁnite regress” problem when making inferences about each fundamental. Sargent
(1991) has provided a numerical technique to solve this kind of problem. Although
static models may lose some dynamic insights, important properties about the levels
of variables still remain. In contrast, the appealing feature of a static model is that
a closed form solution is generally possible. This is certainly useful in studying the
asset pricing mechanism. Related to this paper is Hussman’s (1992) work, in which he
models a dividend process similar to the approach taken here. His model, however, is a
single asset model. Also relevant to this paper is Zhou (1994b)’s dynamic multi- asset
model. Yet, similar to Admati’s, only a single fundamental is assumed with diﬀerences
in the information structure. This paper puts more emphases on the role of incomplete
information in a multi- asset framework.
Many interesting implications emerge from our model: (1) increases in asset prices
should not be necessarily associated with increases in its payoﬀs both in a comparative
static sense and in a statistical inference sense; (2) the same asset can be viewed fun-
damentally diﬀerent at the same time by diﬀerent agents; (3) equilibrium prices depend
on each payoﬀ diﬀerently conditioned on the information structure; (4) the correlations
between fundamentals and prices can be rather low; (5) due to the uncertainty in the
incomplete information structure both risk premiums and price volatilities can be very
high; and (6) the model generates a check shaped price-volume relationship.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the
basic structure of the model and deﬁnes a rational expectations equilibrium. Under both
the equalized information structure and the general information structure, equilibrium
2In the case of asymmetric interpretation, we can assume that agents are heterogeneous both in the
broad sense where there are two types of agents induced by personal characteristics, such as tastes,
preferences, diﬀerent loss functions, and so on, and in a narrow sense where a diﬀerent error structure
applies to diﬀerent agents in translating the same signal due to knowledge level, experience, and so on.
These personal speciﬁc information sets are assumed to be exogenous to the model.
4properties are studied in section 3. Numerical examples that further demonstrate the
unique features of the model are presented in section 4. Trading volume implications
are studied in section 5. section 6 presents concluding remarks.
2 The Model
Our model is a multi-asset, multi-fundamental model which is a generalization of Admati
(1985). In the following discussion a fundamental is deﬁned as an underlying force that
generates payoﬀs of an asset.
2.1 The model structure
There is one risk-free asset that pays Runits, and n risky assets that pay ˜ F (=
[˜ f1,···, ˜ fn] ) units in the second period. As discussed earlier, we further assume that
asset i’s payoﬀ ˜ fi in turn consists of two diﬀerent payoﬀ components ˜ gi and ˜ hi,w h i c h
are generated by the ﬁrst and the second fundamentals respectively, that is ˜ fi =˜ gi + ˜ hi.
All agents live for two periods. They trade assets in the ﬁrst period and consume in the
second period. Each agent maximizes the expected utility derived from her total wealth
in the second period including returns from investment. Initially, agent a owns w0a units
of consumption goods as an endowment and will invest a vector Da of shares in the n
risky assets.
If we let the riskless asset be the numeraire and denote ˜ P as the price vector of the
n risky assets, agent a’s second period wealth will then be,
˜ w1a =( w0a − D
 
a ˜ P)R + Da ˜ F. (1)
As a convention, we assume that each agent has a CARA (Constant Absolute Risk
Aversion) utility function of the following form,
ua(˜ w1a)=−e
− 1
τa ˜ w1a , (2)
where 1
τa is the coeﬃcient of absolute risk aversion (or τa is the coeﬃcient of risk toler-
ance). Agents are heterogeneous in receiving signals about fundamentals. Speciﬁcally,
5there are two groups of investors, with N1 agents and N2 agents in each group, re-
spectively. At the beginning of the ﬁrst period, agent a(j)i ng r o u pI receives a vector
of signals ˜ Xa(j) about the payoﬀ vector ˜ G (= [˜ g1,···, ˜ gn] ) from the ﬁrst fundamental,
and agent b(k)i ng r o u pII receives a vector of signals ˜ Yb(k) about the payoﬀ vector3 ˜ H
(= [ ˜ h1,···, ˜ hn] ) from the second fundamental, i.e.,
˜ Xa(j) = ˜ G + εG,a(j),a n d
˜ Yb(k) = ˜ H + εH,b(k),
where εG,a(j) and εH,b(k) are the noises of the signals. Although we assume that  G,a(j),
 H,b(k), ˜ G,a n d ˜ H are independent of each other, i.e., payoﬀ signals are private infor-
mation, we allow possible correlations among the ﬁrst (or the second) fundamentals of
diﬀerent assets as well as correlations among payoﬀ signals of diﬀerent assets. This struc-
ture of fundamentals is convenient to study both the eﬀect of incomplete information
in the sense of partial payoﬀ signals, and the role played by asymmetric information in
terms of diﬀerences in the precision of the payoﬀ signals. For mathematical simplicity,
joint normality is assumed for all random variables. In particular, ˜ G, ˜ H,  G,a,a n d H,b
have means ¯ G and ¯ H, and zeros, respectively, and variance-covariance matrices VG, VH,
SG,a and SH,b, respectively. As is common in the literature, the per capita asset supply
vector ˜ Z is assumed to be exogenously determined, and is independent of each funda-
mental as well as the noises of the payoﬀ signals. Furthermore, ˜ Z is also assumed to
have a joint normal distribution with a mean vector ¯ Z and a variance-covariance matrix
VZ.4
2.2 The equilibrium concept
Using the current model structure, deﬁne a rational expectations equilibrium in the
following way,
Deﬁnition 1 A rational expectations equilibrium for a ﬁnite economy is a price vector
3One can interpret the information structure in the followingway. Everyone has access to the same
information set or reads the same news release. But for exogenous reasons, diﬀerent investors focus on
diﬀerent pieces of information. Also, for ease of exposition in the future, we refer to “a signal” as “a
vector of signals”, and “the ﬁrst (second) fundamental” as “the ﬁrst (second) vector of fundamentals”.
4When there is no noisy supply, VZ is simply assumed to be zero.
6˜ P and demand functions Da(j)( ˜ Xa(j), ˜ P), Db(k)(˜ Yb(k), ˜ P), j =1 ,···,N1, k =1 ,···,N2,
such that:
(i) ˜ P is ({ ˜ Xa(1),···, ˜ Xa(N1)}, {˜ Yb(1),···, ˜ Yb(N2)}, ˜ Z) measurable;
(ii) Da(j)( ˜ Xa(j), ˜ P) ∈ arg maxDa(j) E(ua(j)( ˜ Wa(j))| ˜ Xa(j), ˜ P),a n dDb(k)(˜ Yb(k), ˜ P) ∈ arg
maxDb(k) E(ub(k)( ˜ Wb(k))|˜ Yb(k), ˜ P);a n d
(iii) 1
N1+N2[
 N1
j=1Da(j)( ˜ Xa(j), ˜ P) +
 N2
k=1 Db(k)(˜ Yb(k), ˜ P)] = ˜ Z almost surely.
One strategy for solving the rational expectations equilibrium is to apply the method
of undetermined coeﬃcients by ﬁrst assuming the following linear equilibrium price
vector,
˜ P = A0 +
N1  
j=1
A1,a(j) ˜ Xa(j) +
N2  
k=1
A2,b(k)˜ Yb(k) − A3 ˜ Z, (3)
where A0 is an n×1 constant vector, and A1,a(j) (j =1 ,···,N1),A 2,b(k) (k =1 ,···,N2),
A3,a r en × n constant matrices. This is a diﬃcult problem to solve even for the case
with one asset and one single fundamental (see Hellwig (1980)). In order to derive a
closed form solution, we assume a continuum of agents, where the number of agents in
each group goes to inﬁnity. In particular, we index each agent in the ﬁrst group by
a ∈ [0,1] and each agent in the second group by b ∈ [0,1].5 We ignore the problem
of possible non-existence when integrating over random variables by adopting the same
convention as in Admati (1985), i.e., if a random process (˜ ηa)a∈[0,1] is independent with
zero mean and a bounded variance, and (˜ η 
a)a∈[0,1] is almost surely integrable, then
  1
0 (˜ ηa + ˜ η 
a)da ≡
  1
0 ˜ η 
ada by applying the central limit theorem. This allows us to write
  1
0 ˜ Xada = ˜ Ga . s . and
  1
0 ˜ Ybdb = ˜ Ha . s .. Under this convention, equation (3) can be
simpliﬁed to yield the following form:
˜ P = A0 + A1 ˜ G + A2 ˜ H − A3 ˜ Z. (4)
Correspondingly, we solve for a rational expectations equilibrium in an economy with
a continuum of agents, where the equilibrium price vector depends only on the true
fundamentals ˜ G and ˜ H as well as the market supply ˜ Z. Therefore we should replace
condition (i)i nDeﬁnition 1 with
5For simplicity, equal measure for the two groups of agents is assumed here. Unequal measure could
also be accommodated.
7(i’) ˜ P which is measurable on ( ˜ G, ˜ H, ˜ Z).6
For notational convenience in the following discussion, we refer to an agent in the ﬁrst
(second) group as agent a (agent b).
2.3 The information structure
Before discussing the equilibrium implications, special information structures need to be
developed. Being unable to observe every fundamental, agents do not have a complete
information structure. A measurement for the degree of relative completeness of the in-
formation structure is thus necessary. We start with the conditional variance-covariance
matrices for ˜ G and ˜ H respectively, which can be shown to have the following forms by
projection theorem,
QG,a = Va r( ˜ G| ¯ Xa)=Va r( ˜ G) − Va r[E( ˜ G| ¯ Xa)] = (V
−1
G + SG,a
−1)
−1,a n d
QH,b = Va r( ˜ H|¯ Yb)=Va r( ˜ H) − Va r[E( ˜ H|¯ Yb)] = (V
−1
H + SH,b
−1)
−1.
Since agent a’s signal Xa is only relevant to the ﬁrst fundamental, her conditional
variance-covariance matrix of the overall payoﬀ ˜ F will simply be (QG,a + VH). Simi-
larly, agent b will have conditional variance-covariance matrix of (QH,b + VG). These
conditional variances can serve as a basis for such a measurement.
Deﬁnition 2 The completeness of agent a’s payoﬀ signals and agent b’s payoﬀ signals
can be measured by parameter matrices Λa and Λb, respectively, with
Λa =( QG,a + VH)
−1QG,a ,a n d
Λb =( QH,b + VG)
−1QH,b.
Essentially, Λa (or Λb) is the conditional volatility of the observable fundamentals relative
to the conditional volatility of the overall fundamentals. This is intuitive. If we only have
very limited information about one fundamental, relatively speaking, it does not makes
much diﬀerence for being unable to observe the other fundamental, i.e., the information
6There are some trivial equilibria in this model, such as, ˜ P =
˜ F
R (a fully revealingequilibrium). We
eliminate these equilibria simply because they fail to justify the agents’ incentives to acquire information.
8is relatively complete. It is not the precision of a signal that causes the incompleteness
of information, rather the structure of the model. When VH = 0 (meaning a single
fundamental), agent a’s information should be complete under any circumstances, which
is the case with Λa = I. However, when ˜ H is very volatile with large VH, agent a will
have a big disadvantage for not observing ˜ H at the same level of precision. Therefore,
her information is rather incomplete. Moreover, if two agents from diﬀerent groups have
the same level of precision in their payoﬀ signals, i.e., SG,a = SH,b, agent a’s information
is more complete relative to agent b’s, if ˜ G is more volatile than ˜ H.T h i si st r u es i n c e
ΛaΛ
−1
b = VGV
−1
H .
In a model with a single asset and a single fundamental, the accuracy of a signal
(or the informational content) is usually deﬁned as the inverse of the variance of the
signal noise. For a multi-asset model with single fundamental, similar measures can
also be used. In contrast, the information measure in the case of multiple fundamentals
should not only convey the absolute “volume” of information about each fundamental
but also reﬂect the information relative to the total information in order to take into
account the incompleteness of signals. In other words, the information measure about
each fundamental has to be comparable.
Deﬁnition 3 The parameter matrix Γa that captures the informational content of the
payoﬀ signal ˜ Xa has the following form,
Γa =( VG + VH)
−1[VH(VG + VH)
−1 + SG,aV
−1
G ]
−1,
and the informational content matrix Γb of the payoﬀ signal ˜ Yb is similarly deﬁned as,
Γb =( VG + VH)
−1[VG(VG + VH)
−1 + SH,bV
−1
H ]
−1.
Clearly when VH = 0, there will be only one (stochastic) fundamental. So Γa reduces
to SG,a
−1, which is the conventional measure. When SG,a →∞ ,Γ a → 0, suggesting
that there is no information in the signal. Since one can show that Γa =Λ aS
−1
G,a,f o ra
given precision level of the signal, the more complete the signal, the more information
the signal will convey. In general, changes in SG,a have two eﬀects on the informational
content. It determines both the precision and the completeness of a signal. The net eﬀect
will be an inverse relationship as shown in the above deﬁnition. The same intuition works
for Γb.
93 The equilibrium properties
We are now able to examine the equilibrium properties under stochastic supply. The
rationale for the noisy supply assumption can be found in the literature including Gross-
man (1976), Hellwig (1980), Campbell and Kyle (1988). It is true that a closed-form
solution is not always possible in the presence of a noisy supply7, the model is potentially
more useful with rich asset pricing implications. At the same time, we emphasize an
important special case with a closed-form solution in order to gain insights to the pricing
mechanism. In particular, we assume equal aggregate informational content of signals
across groups. For comparison reason, the no noisy supply case is brieﬂy discussed ﬁrst.
3.1 A case with deterministic supply
In a conventional model, the existence of a noisy supply resolves the Grossman (1976)
paradox in the sense that it prevents an equilibrium price from being eﬃcient in re-
vealing private information. In the current model with multiple fundamentals and with
incomplete information structure, a similar result emerges8.
Theorem 1 Under the above structure and in the absence of a noisy supply, a non-
fully revealing linear rational expectations equilibrium does not exist, i.e., A1  = A2 and
A3 =0can not hold simultaneously in equation (4).
Without a noisy supply, the equilibrium prices are suﬃcient statistics for incomplete
private information. Therefore, private information plays no role in agents’ demand
functions.
3.2 A closed-form solution under equalized information struc-
ture
The prior discussion prompts the necessity of introducing noisy supply in the model. In
general, an analytical solution of (4) is impossible since it involves more than solving
7However, we are able to discuss the ex ante properties of the equilibrium.
8The proof is available from the author.
10an Algebraic Ricatii Equation. We restrict ourselves to an important special case in
this section, and resort to a numerical solution for the general case in section 4. The
following theorem summarizes the main results.
Theorem 2 In an economy with noisy supply, the equilibrium price vector depends
equally on the payoﬀs from both fundamentals if and only if the aggregate informational
content of signals is equalized across diﬀerent groups of agents, i.e., Γ1=Γ2 ≡ Γ.I f
such a condition holds, there exists a unique rational expectations equilibrium with the
following linear price function,
˜ P = A0 + A1 ˜ G + A2 ˜ H − A3 ˜ Z, (5)
where,
A0 = R
−1[2Γ + Λ1V
−1
G +Λ 2V
−1
H + τΓ
 V
−1
Z Γ]
−1 (6)
[(Γ + Λ1V
−1
G +Λ 2V
−1
H )( ¯ G + ¯ H)+τΓ
 V
−1
Z ¯ Z],
A1 = A2 = R
−1[2Γ + Λ1V
−1
G +Λ 2V
−1
H + τΓ
 V
−1
Z Γ]
−1(Γ + τΓ
 V
−1
Z Γ), (7)
A3 = R
−1[2Γ + Λ1V
−1
G +Λ 2V
−1
H + τΓ
 V
−1
Z Γ]
−1(I + τΓ
 V
−1
Z ). (8)
Coeﬃcient τ (=
  1
0 τada+
  1
0 τbdb) is the aggregate economy-wide risk tolerance; matrices
Λ1 (=
  1
0 τaΛada) and Λ2 (=
  1
0 τbΛbdb) are the aggregate completeness of the payoﬀ
signals received by the ﬁrst and the second groups of agents, respectively; and matrices
Γ1 (=
  1
0 τaΓada) and Γ2 (=
  1
0 τbΓbdb) are group I and group II agents’ aggregate
informational content, respectively.
Proof: See Appendix A. Q.E.D.
The assumptions we have made in Theorem 2 indicate an equalized information
structure. Coeﬃcient matrices A1(or A2)a n dA3 measure the marginal contribution of
each payoﬀ as well as asset supply to the equilibrium price vector9. Comparing that with
Admati’s10, we ﬁnd that, in general, A1 (or A2) is smaller and A3 is larger than that
9When VZ → 0 the equilibrium price will approach 1
R( ˜ G + ˜ H), which is consistent with Theorem
1. Note also that the current structure of the equilibrium price is observationally equivalent to Ad-
mati’s. However, our model oﬀers additional insights into understanding the diﬀerent role played by
the aggregate information and the aggregate information completeness in equilibrium.
10By assuming VG = VH = .5VAdmati for fundamentals and SG = SH = .5SAdmati for signals, the
two models are comparable. Detailed comparison is available from the author.
11of Admati’s. This means that the equilibrium prices depend less on the fundamentals
and more on supplies due to the incomplete information structure. Therefore, the price
level will be relatively low, which induces a high risk premium. This sheds light on the
equity premium puzzle, which is elaborated on later.
When payoﬀs as well as supplies of individual assets are independent, the price of
one asset will still depend on the payoﬀs of other assets if signals are correlated. This
feature distinguishes a multi-asset model from a single asset model. By examining the
coeﬃcient matrices A1 (or A2)a n dA3, we also observe that, on the one hand, the
equilibrium prices tend to rely more on the payoﬀs and less on the noisy supply as
more informational content aggregated in the economy. On the other hand, in terms of
equilibrium prices, the more complete the aggregate information is, the less impact of
both the fundamentals and the noisy supply. This makes perfect sense. When agents
are able to infer the overall fundamentals more accurately, there is less need for public
information to be constructive.
In a single fundamental model with complete information structure, one can always
conclude that good news drive up the asset price in a certain way (see Milgrom (1981) and
Admati (1985)). This is intuitive, yet not necessarily true in our model. Mathematically,
the variance-covariance matrices between the fundamentals and the price vector are
not necessarily positive deﬁnite11. Therefore, we cannot draw a stochastic dominance
conclusion. In other words, one cannot tell whether or not the conditional distribution
for the ith asset price ˜ pi given ˜ gi (or ˜ hi) is stochastically increasing or decreasing in the
realization of the fundamental. This is because good or bad news about one fundamental
may well be oﬀset by another piece of news about the other fundamental. Such a unique
property of our model is a result of the incomplete information structure.
Given both the private payoﬀ signals and the public information conveyed by the
equilibrium price vector, the conditional distribution for the payoﬀ ˜ F evaluated by agent
a (or b) has a multi-normal distribution as shown in equation (24) (or equation (25)) of
Appendix A. The forecasting errors in predicting payoﬀs based on the private information
are orthogonal to the equilibrium prices, which means agents are rationally exploring
all the available information to form their expectations. Similarly, in a conventional
11Although matrices Γ + Λ1V
−1
G and Γ + Λ2V
−1
H are positive deﬁnite, matrix Γ alone is not positive
deﬁnite. Moreover, the product of two positive deﬁnite matrices is not even necessarily symmetric.
12model, a rational agent will choose a portfolio that maximizes her expected utility. In
particular, the decisions on portfolio selection under a CARA utility function will be
based on mean-variance considerations. In contrast, when information is incomplete,
agents even with the same risk aversion, will value the tradeoﬀs between risk and return
diﬀerently.
Corollary 1 In equilibrium, agents will choose diﬀerent portfolios of risky assets ac-
cording to both private payoﬀ signals and public information. The demand functions for
agent a and b will be linear in the following forms,
D( ˜ Xa, ˜ P)=C0a + C1a ˜ Xa − C2a ˜ P, (9)
D(˜ Yb, ˜ P)=C0b + C1b˜ Yb − C2b ˜ P, (10)
where,

   
   
C0a = τa{(Γa ¯ H +Λ aV
−1
G ¯ F) − (VZΓ −1 + τI)−1[(Γ + Λ1V
−1
G +Λ 2V
−1
H ) ¯ F − ¯ Z]},
C1a = τaΓa ,
C2a = τaR[Γa +Λ aV
−1
G − (VZΓ −1 + τI)−1(Γ + Λ1V
−1
G +Λ 2V
−1
H )],

   
   
C0b = τb{(Γb ¯ G +Λ bV
−1
H ¯ F) − (VZΓ −1 + τI)−1[(Γ + Λ1V
−1
G +Λ 2V
−1
H ) ¯ F − ¯ Z]},
C1b = τbΓb ,
C2b = τbR[Γb +Λ bV
−1
H − (VZΓ −1 + τI)−1(Γ + Λ1V
−1
G +Λ 2V
−1
H )].
Equations (9) and (10) show that individual demand is measurable with respect to
both the public information conveyed by price vector ˜ P and the private payoﬀ signal ˜ Xa
(or ˜ Yb). In other words, the equilibrium is indeed a true rational expectations equilibrium.
When both informational content and information completeness of private signals im-
prove, agents will be more aggressive in ﬁltering out the public information with the help
of private information, which leads to an elastic demand (large C2a,o rC2b). Therefore,
even agents with the same level of risk aversion will have diﬀerent demand schedules
depending on the informational structure. At the same time, individuals’ demands will
be less elastic when the aggregate informational measure Γ or the aggregate information
completeness measure Λ1 (or Λ2) increases. This is because increases in prices are more
likely due to changes in fundamentals that induce high demand.
The marginal private information eﬀect measured by coeﬃcient matrix C1a (or C1b)
is only related to an individual’s risk aversion and the informational content of signal
13Γa (or Γb). At the same level of risk aversion, the higher is the informational content of
the signals, the more conﬁdent an agent will be in predicting the future returns of an
asset. Therefore, she will be willing to hold more risky assets. However, individuals do
not relay on the aggregate information or completeness of signals in determining their
responses to private signals since the aggregate information is equalized across groups.
Finally, the intercept in the demand schedule C0a (or C0b) again depends on the measure
of incompleteness of an individual’s payoﬀ signal. In other words, individuals not only
share the risk in the variability of asset returns, but also share the risk in not having
complete information about fundamentals.
For comparison, consider the traditional Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) of
Sharpe (1964) and Lintner (1965). It is well known that the CAPM model is based
on the premise of choosing a mean- variance eﬃcient portfolio. In the current model,
equations (26) and (27) show that an individual’s investment decision (i.e., the demand
schedule) also relies on the mean- variance conditions due to the normality and CARA
utility assumptions. However, the objective for an individual agent here is to maximize
her expected utility, instead of minimizing the unconditional portfolio variance at a
given rate of return. These two objectives are not always coincident, and the portfolio
choice will not necessarily be mean-variance eﬃcient in the usual sense. Furthermore, as
individuals possess diﬀerent informational contents (Γa or Γb) and diﬀerent realizations
of speciﬁc information ( ˜ Xa or ˜ Xb), the evaluation of tradeoﬀs between risk and return
is individual speciﬁc. In this sense each agent has a diﬀerent asset pricing model.
3.3 The general equilibrium price properties
Although numerical methods have to be used to ﬁnd equilibrium prices in general, we
obtain the following results due to the fact that information equalization is a necessary
and suﬃcient condition in Theorem 2.
Corollary 2 When the aggregate informational contents are not equalized across groups,
equilibrium prices will depend on each fundamental with diﬀerent coeﬃcients, i.e., A1  =
A2 in equation (5).
14Therefore, equilibrium prices can be expressed in the following way,
˜ P = E( ˜ P)+A1( ˜ G − ¯ G)+A2( ˜ H − ¯ H) − A3( ˜ Z − ¯ Z), (11)
where the ﬁrst term is the unconditional expected equilibrium price. Essentially, equa-
tion (11) is a multi-factor model with distinct factor loadings according to Corollary 2.
The factors in our model include two fundamental factors and one supply factor. They
can be viewed as discounted unexpected payoﬀs and unexpected supply. The factor load-
ings depend not only on informational content but also on the information completeness.
Although the form is standard and its interpretation is clear, implications can be dif-
ferent. The ex post price change should not necessarily be attributed to ﬂuctuations in
the overall fundamentals ( ˜ F). In the current model, stock prices will adjust with the
individual fundamentals ˜ G and ˜ H even when the overall fundamental ˜ F remains the
same. Furthermore, if there are changes in the information structure, such as in the
informational content or the relative completeness of information, prices will ﬂuctuate
accordingly even with the same supply and payoﬀs. In reality we often observe large
swings in prices even when ﬁrms meet analysts’ expectations. For example, Advanced
Micro Devices beat the analysts’s expected earnings by 18 cents in the third quarter of
1998. Yet the share price sank by 20%.
These features distinguish our model from a conventional asymmetric information
model in the sense that a price will react to information with greater volatility. Fur-
thermore, the loading matrix A3 for the supply may not necessarily be positive deﬁnite
in general. It could have negative diagonal elements as shown in the numerical example
in the next section. In such cases, one can interpret the corresponding assets as being
“over-priced” due to the excess demand. Similarly, in the case of negative diagonal ele-
ments in matrices A1 and A2, prices inversely depend on surprises in the fundamentals
which could not happen in an ordinary factor model.
It is also important to understand the unconditional expected equilibrium price in
equation (11) in order to compare with the CAPM implications.
Theorem 3 The ex ante equilibrium price vector ¯ P equals the diﬀerence between the
discounted expected payoﬀs and the risk premium, i.e.,
¯ P = E( ˜ P)=
1
R
( ¯ G + ¯ H) −
1
R
Ω ¯ Z, (12)
15where Ω=(
  1
0 τaVa
−1da+
  1
0 τbVb
−1db)−1 is the aggregate conditional variance-covariance
matrix of the total fundamental, and Va and Vb are the conditional variance-covariance
matrices of the ﬁrst and second groups of agents, respectively.
Proof: See Appendix B Q.E.D.
Theorem 3 holds regardless to the diﬀerences in the aggregate informational content.
Therefore, it is important in two ways. First, the nature of asymmetric and incomplete
information is irrelevant in determining the role of the fundamentals ex ante.I no t h e r
words, diﬀerent from ex post prices, only the overall fundamental matters. Second, if we
deﬁne the risk premium as π = ˜ F −R ˜ P,Ω¯ Z is the ex ante risk premium in equation (12).
It is primarily inﬂuenced by the information structure, especially by the incompleteness
of information.
From the perspective of the CAPM, we can study the ex ante risk premium. If the
market payoﬀ ˜ fm is deﬁned as the weighted payoﬀs to fundamentals of each individual
asset, i.e., ˜ fm = α  ˜ F,w h e r eα =( α1,α 2,···,α n)  and αi =¯ zi/¯ z,¯ z =
 n
i=1 ¯ zi, then the
ex ante risk premium for each asset and the overall market risk premium can be written
as ¯ zΩα and ¯ zα Ωα respectively. With this notation and simpliﬁcation, it is easy to see
that the ex ante individual risk premium is proportional to the “conditional” covariance
between individual’s payoﬀs and the market payoﬀs. This is in the essence of the classical
CAPM model. Comparing to our model, the diﬀerence is that, in the CAPM model,
only the market risk will be compensated by an expected excess return proportional
to its covariance with the market excess returns. Our model implies that part of the
risk is compensated for by a discount on the equilibrium price, where the discount is
proportional to the “conditional” covariance between the payoﬀs of each individual asset
and the market payoﬀs. The “conditional” covariance takes into account the incomplete
information structure. This is especially important in our model due to the additional
risk of incomplete information.
In order to be more speciﬁc, let us reexamine the special case where information
is equalized across groups with Ω = (2Γ + Λ1V
−1
G +Λ 2V
−1
H + τΓ V
−1
Z Γ)−1.T h e r i s k
premium (Ω) in this case decreases with Γ, Λ1,a n dΛ 2, which is counter intuitive.
However, when the aggregate informational content is high, all agents have relatively
accurate information. Therefore, the market should not provide a high premium to
16attract individuals holding risky assets12. In general, the risk premium in our model is
higher than that of Admati’s. Using the same conformable parameter matrices, the risk
premium in our model can be ampliﬁed by a factor more than (I +VAdmatiS
−1
Admati)w h e n
assuming the parameter structure in footnote 14. With a general variance-covariance
structure, the incompleteness of the signal will always induce an additional risk in the
precise inference about diﬀerent fundamentals. Agents will thus be less certain about
the future returns and, as a consequence, higher returns over the risk-free rate must be
provided to rational agents in order for them to hold risky assets.
Another property worth noting here is that we do not need a large noisy supply
to generate trading volume as in the conventional single asset model. In fact, even
when the aggregate unexpected noisy supply is zero, the noisy supply of each asset
still directly aﬀects both the price of the market portfolio and individual asset prices
since A3 is not an identity matrix. Moreover, the noisy supply has a secondary eﬀect
on the equilibrium price through its volatility, which connects the supply risk with the
fundamentals. Basically, high supply volatility not only increases the risk premium but
also ampliﬁes the eﬀect of the unexpected realization on the payoﬀs to fundamentals.
This is because the more volatile the supply is, the more diﬃcult it is for rational agents
to accurately forecast the payoﬀs from the equilibrium prices. It ampliﬁes the risk in
signal extraction, which should also be compensated with a large premium.
4 Numerical examples
In a single asset model, an increase in a fundamental always leads to an increase in the
asset price. Similarly, a rise in the asset price tends to convince an agent that other
informed agents have high signals about the fundamental, which will lead to a high
prediction in the future payoﬀs. Therefore, a risky asset will never be a Giﬀen good.
These intuitions may break down in a multi- asset model as suggested by Admati (1985).
Especially in our model these intuitions may no longer hold both in a statistical sense
and in a comparative static sense.13 In this section, we ﬁrst compare the numerical
results obtained from our closed-form solution with that of Admati’s. We then examine
12For each individual agent, however, it is still true that the higher the cost she pays to gather
accurate information, the larger the returns she should expect
13In Admati’s multi-asset model, the intuitions only fail in the comparative static case.
17some of the unique properties under the general information structure.
4.1 Case I: equalized information
Using comparable parameters to that of Admati’s14, the ﬁrst block row in Table 1 shows
counter intuitive phenomena emerging in a comparative static sense, namely: (1) the
equilibrium price of the ﬁrst asset is decreasing in its own payoﬀ while increasing in
its own supply; (2) the higher the price of the ﬁrst asset, ceteris paribus, the lower the
predicted payoﬀs for both assets; and (3) the second asset is a Giﬀen good.15 Moreover,
as mentioned earlier, elements in the coeﬃcient matrix A1 are smaller (or more negative)
while those in A3 are larger than Admati’s. In the inference equation, we see that
agents rely more on prices to make inferences about asset payoﬀs due to the incomplete
information structure. At the same time demand becomes less elastic in prices and
depends less on private information. This is straightforward since the incompleteness
of information structure makes agents less aggressive when compared to a conventional
model.
Insert Table 1
What is even more interesting is that a negative relationship between prices and
fundamentals could emerge when there is no correlation in the supply of diﬀerent assets.
This is only possible under the structure of our model. For example, when v(1,2) =5 ,
and all the other parameters remain the same except for VZ =

 50
0 .4

,w eo b s e r v e
a similar result as that listed in the ﬁrst block row of Table 1. Again, this property is
largely due to the information structure associated with the multiple fundamentals. In
this sense the incomplete information embedded in this structure plays a similar role to
that of a noisy supply.
14We assume that R = 1; the aggregate risk tolerance for both groups is one (or τ = 2), the variance-
covariance matrix for each agent’s payoﬀ signal is SG,a = SH,b = 1
2I, and there are two risky assets
with the variance-covariance structure of VG = VH = 1
2
 
1 v(1,2)
v(2,1) 26
 
,V Z =
 
53
32
 
.
15Admati (1985)oﬀers a detailed discussion on these observations. The key gradients in understanding
the phenomenon are the high correlations between fundamentals of diﬀerent assets and the opposite
ratio of the variances (across assets) for the fundamentals as well as the asset supply.
18The potential price and return volatilities in our model could be much higher than
that of a conventional asymmetric information model. In the current example, they are
almost ﬁve times larger than that of Admati’s model. This shields light on the issue
of stock market volatility observed in empirical studies (for example, Malkiel and Xu
(1999)). Therefore, understanding the mechanism in our model oﬀers an extra channel
toward explaining the high volatility phenomena. Generally speaking, signal extraction
from both private and public signals is more diﬃcult since information is incomplete.
This creates an additional risk that aﬀects the equilibrium prices.
Table 1 also demonstrates how the comparative static changes when correlations
among fundamentals of diﬀerent assets decrease. This is important, because changes
in the correlation structure can alter the informational content of signals in our model
even when the variance-covariance matrixes of signals remain the same. Speciﬁcally the
informational content of signals decreases as expected when payoﬀs to the fundamentals
are less correlated (not shown in the table). Consequently, the demand for both assets
is less dependent on private signals. The prices in the demand schedule exhibit both
the conventional substitution and informational eﬀects16.W h e n v(1,2) decreases, the
marginal eﬀect of the ﬁrst asset price [Ca2]1,1 decreases on its own demand, and the
marginal eﬀect of the second asset price [Ca2]2,2 increases on its own demand. This
is consistent with the pattern of price eﬀect Ba2 in the inference equations. It can be
understood from the balance between the substitution eﬀect and informational eﬀect.
The marginal eﬀects of prices in agents’ inferences have diﬀerent patterns. That of ˜ p1
is decreasing and that of ˜ p2 is increasing with v(1,2). In order to understand this phenom-
enon, we assume that agents understand the pattern of equilibrium prices. When private
payoﬀ signals convey less information, public information will provide more information
about fundamentals. Thus, investors tend to rely heavily on public information to make
inferences, which makes [Ba2]1,1 and [Ba2]2,2 rise. At the same time, the pattern of the
equilibrium price shows that ˜ p1 will reveal more information about ˜ f1 and ˜ p2 conveys less
information about ˜ f2 when v1,2 decreases. The net eﬀect is the observed pattern found
in table 1. There are also two factors in determining the role of private information
in agents’ inferences. When v(1,2) decreases, the informational content decreases, which
makes agents less conﬁdent about their abilities. At the same time, when assets are less
correlated, the conditional volatility about future payoﬀs decreases. An agent tends to
16This is analogous to the substitution eﬀect and the income eﬀect in the commodity market.
19rely more on her own private information to make an inference. In this example the latter
force is stronger. Therefore, both [Ba1]1,1 and [Ba1]2,2 are increasing. It is a much more
diﬃcult task to understand the pattern in equilibrium prices. This is because that the
deﬁnition of a rational expectations equilibrium requires a consistency between agents’
statistical beliefs and the market clearing condition. Here we only make an observation.
With a decrease in v(1,2), the “abnormal” feature in the pricing equations, namely the
negative response to the change in its own payoﬀ, disappears.
Our model is also unique from the perspective of statistical inference. Especially,
the Milgrom’s (1984) conjecture, i.e., the conditional distribution of ˜ pi|˜ gi (or ˜ pi|˜ hi)i s
stochastically increasing in the realization of ˜ gi (or ˜ hi), may no longer hold. It is useful to
understand some of the phenomena that are diﬃcult to explain in a conventional model.
The following example demonstrates the phenomenon. Again, we assume R =1 ,τ =2 ,
and the following parameter matrices
VG =

 9.5 .4
.43 .0

 VH =

 0.52 .4
2.41 4 .

 VZ =

 2.51 .5
1.51 .0


SG,a =

 10 .05
.05 1

 SH,b =

 .41 2.35
2.35 13.7

.
It is easy to verify that aggregate information is still equalized across groups in this case.
The equilibrium price vector can be written as,
∆ ˜ P =

 0.45 −.11
−.18 0.46

∆ ˜ G +

 0.45 −.11
−.18 0.46

∆ ˜ H −

 4.47 −.60
−.45 8.47

∆ ˜ Z.
Note that we use ∆ to denote the diﬀerence between a random variable and its uncon-
ditional mean. Although the equilibrium prices have the usual signs in the comparative
static sense, equilibrium prices do not have the usual properties from the statistical
inference point of view. It is easy to show that Cov(˜ p1,˜ g1) > 0, Cov(˜ p2,˜ g2) > 0,
Cov(˜ p2,˜ h2) > 0, but Cov(˜ p1,˜ h1) < 0, which means that a high realization of ˜ h1 tends to
force ˜ p1 to drop stochastically, i.e., the conditional distribution of ˜ p1|˜ h1 to shift down-
wards. At the same time, a large realization of ˜ g1 will more likely be associated with an
increase in ˜ p1. This observation is useful in understanding why a stock price could fall
at one time and appreciate at another time, both after good earning announcements.
Essentially, it is determined by the diﬀerent role of each fundamental and is inﬂuenced
20by the information structure we have discussed. Such a phenomenon could only happen
in our multi-asset-multiple fundamental model.
In a conventional asymmetric information model, individual investors’ demands are
similar. The demand schedules in our model could be completely diﬀerent for individuals.
Consider the following example,
VG =

 .071 .32
.32 3.0

 VH =

 0.1 .15
.15 1.3

 VZ =

 3.62 .5
2.52 .0


SG,a =

 1.5 .4
.41 .5

 SH,b =

 3.37 .574
.574 .211

,
which produces the following demand functions for diﬀerent agents,
∆Da(∆ ˜ Xa,∆ ˜ P)=τa

 0.22 −.07
−.07 0.31

∆ ˜ Xa − τa

 5.65 −.58
2.61 0.03

∆ ˜ P,
∆Db(∆˜ Yb,∆ ˜ P)=τb

 0.22 −.07
−.07 .31

∆˜ Ya − τb

 5.73 −.57
2.62 −.09

∆ ˜ P.
Although the demand equations of the ﬁrst group of agents appear to be normal, those
of the second group of agents are “abnormal”. In particular, agents in the second group
treat the second asset as a Giﬀen good, while the agents in the ﬁrst group treat it as a
normal good. This suggests that diﬀerent agents in our model could view the same asset
fundamentally diﬀerently. Given the equilibrium price behaviors, we inspect the mech-
anism behind it. The key factor in understanding such a phenomenon is the following
statistical observation: the event that a high volatile variable changes by more than a
less volatile variable, is more likely to occur than the opposite event. Remember in the
statistical inference, changing one variable does not require holding the other variables
constant as in the comparative static analysis. Since Cov(˜ p2,˜ g2) > 0, Cov(˜ p2,˜ h2) > 0,
an increase in ˜ p2 will cause both the conditional distribution ˜ g2|˜ p2 and the conditional
distribution ˜ h2|˜ p2 to rise. Due to the high volatility of ˜ g2 relative to that of ˜ h2,t h e
former should rise much more. In other words, changes in ˜ g2 is very important. How-
ever, agents in the second group do not have information about ˜ g2. They must infer
this information from equilibrium prices. The informational eﬀect of price swamps the
substitution eﬀect. Thus, their demand for the second asset increases with its price. In
contrast, agents in the ﬁrst group receive private information about ˜ g2 and only infor-
21mation about ˜ h2 needs to be extracted from equilibrium prices, which is relatively less
important. Thus, the second asset is a normal good for the ﬁrst group of agents.
4.2 Case II: general information structure
Our model contains many interesting properties even under an equalized information
structure. In principle, equilibrium exists under a general informational structure. As
Corollary 2 states, such equilibrium prices depend on diﬀerent fundamentals with diﬀer-
ent loading coeﬃcient matrices. The corresponding equilibrium implications are much
richer than the special cases. Presumably, one can investigate issues such as: (i)h o w
do the price volatility and risk premium behave? (ii) can prices ﬂuctuate without any
change in the overall fundamentals or supply? (iii) do stock prices closely move with
their fundamentals? and (iv) how important is the role of noisy supply in generating
the results? Since a closed-form solution is impossible under the general information
structure, we will use numerical simulation. Generally speaking, increases in the covari-
ances among fundamentals of diﬀerent assets help increase the informational content
of signals. This is because it enables agents to infer information about payoﬀs of one
asset from that of the other assets. In contrast, increases in the covariances among sig-
nal noises of diﬀerent assets decrease the informational content of signals. The relative
magnitude of the informational content of signals in turn contributes to the importance
of each fundamental in equilibrium prices.
Since our main focus is to study the relative impact of aggregate information from
each group, we further simplify our problem by assuming homogeneous preferences and
symmetric information among agents in the same group17. This assumption further
isolates the unique information structure of our model. Again we will seek a linear
equilibrium price vector similar to equation (5), i.e., ˜ P = A0 + A1 ˜ G + A2 ˜ H − A3 ˜ Z.
Speciﬁcally, we have developed a two-step procedure to solve for the numerical value of
the parameter matrices A0, A1, A2,a n dA3 as shown in Appendix C.
In the following example, we try to answer the questions posted at the beginning of
the section. Again, we assume there are two risky assets, one riskless bond with R =1 ,
17Note that the assumption of a continuum of agents requires us, in principle, to integrate over all
agents’ demand functions to obtain the aggregate demand. In order to calculate this aggregate demand
numerically we have to specify each agent’s signal as an analytical function of an agent’s index.
22and all the agents have the same risk tolerance τa = τb = 1. The following structure
parameters are also assumed,
VG =

 2.00 .5
0.54 .0

 VH =

 1.0 −.5
−.53 .0

 VZ =

 2.0 −.2
−.21 .5


SG,a =

 1.00 .1
0.11 .0

 SH,b =

 1.0 −.1
−.11 .0

.
Following the two step procedure, we ﬁrst solve the 2 × n2 simultaneous equations of
equation (52) for individual elements in matrices A
−1
1 A2 and A
−1
1 A3 numerically18.T h e
results are listed in the ﬁrst panel of Table 2. In particular, the coeﬃcient on fundamental
˜ g1 (˜ g2) is about 80% (20%) larger than that of fundamental ˜ h1 (˜ h2) in the equilibrium
price of the ﬁrst (second) asset. This means that ˜ G has a relatively more important role
than ˜ H in the equilibrium price. Although there is no absolute informational advantage
for group I agents relative to group II agents in terms of the conventional precision
measure, agents of the ﬁrst group have a relative informational advantage in terms of
measure Γ since ˜ G is more volatile than ˜ H. With these computed ratios we can easily
compute the coeﬃcient matrices A1, A2,a n dA3. For ease of exposition, we express the
equilibrium price vector in the following form,
˜ P =

 0.47 0.06
0.09 0.50

∆ ˜ G +

 0.25 −.05
−.05 0.40

∆ ˜ H −

 1.17 −.05
−.03 3.36

∆ ˜ Z
+( ¯ F −

 0.88 −.09
−.09 1.87

 ¯ Z). (13)
Since the diagonal elements in the coeﬃcient matrices for ∆ ˜ G and ∆ ˜ H associated
with the fundamentals are less than .5, a surprise in the realization of the fundamentals
tends to aﬀect the equilibrium prices to a much less degree. As a result, we see from
table 2 that the volatilities of the equilibrium prices Va r( ˜ PF), which are attributed only
to changes in fundamentals, are much lower than that of the fundamental themselves.
Having seen that, we still observe that the overall volatilities of prices Va r( ˜ P)a r em u c h
18As equation (52) is a third order simultaneous equation, potentially we can have multiple equilibria.
In particular, there will be either only one equilibrium or more than three equilibria. In this example,
we have tried diﬀerent startingvalues, and all ended up with either diverg ence in the numerical iteration
or convergence to the same solution.
23larger than that of the fundamentals found in prior empirical studies. Particularly, this
is consistent with the notion of “excess volatility” documented by Shiller (1981). In
other words, prices can change more than what seems to be justiﬁable by changes in
the fundamentals. In the current model, reductions in the variability of fundamentals
have been oﬀset by the noisy supply eﬀect. In is important to note that we do not
need a huge volatility in the noisy supply to have such eﬀects. In fact, a relatively
small exogenous noisy supply has been ampliﬁed through the incomplete information
structure in our model. Similarly, there will be a high level of risk premium Ω due to
the potential risk in the information structure. Therefore, if we only take into account
of market risk alone, the risk premium could be viewed too high. This is relevant to the
“equity premium puzzle” of Mehra and Prescott (1985).
As mentioned before, even when the total payoﬀs to the overall fundamentals remain
the same, prices can still ﬂuctuate. In this example, when a dollar increase in the ﬁrst
fundamental is oﬀset by a dollar decrease in the second fundamental, equation (13)
shows that the prices of the ﬁrst and the second assets fall by 22 cents and 10 cents,
respectively. Numerous examples can be found in reality. In the third quarter of 1995,
Novell Inc. announced that its earnings were about the same as expected by Wall Street
professionals. However, its share price went down by 6.25% due to a sharp decline in
sales of several major business-applications programs.
Finally, it is important to note that the correlations between prices and fundamentals
Corr( ˜ P, ˜ G)a n dCorr( ˜ P, ˜ H) are very low (between 15% and 37%). In other words, the
overall impact of fundamentals may not be as important as once thought. Especially in
a world with incomplete information, fundamentals might only explain a small portion
of the price change. Despite the low correlations between fundamentals and equilibrium
prices, changes in the risk premium are primarily due to changes in the informational
structure and fundamentals rather than noisy supply in general. When we double the
variance-covariance matrix SG,a, the informational content decreases by more than 33%
for group 1 agents. This leads to a 30% drop in Corr( ˜ P, ˜ G). Although the overall
price volatility changes only by a little, the price volatility due to fundamentals actually
decrease by 30%. For this to be true, the price volatility associated with noisy supply
must increase a lot. Correspondingly, the ex ante risk premium (Ω) has increased by
a large amount (about 14%). In contrast, if the variance-covariance matrix of noisy
supply is reduced by three quarters (or 75%) as shown in the second panel of Table 2, the
24correlations between prices and fundamentals have increased by less than 14%, while the
price volatilities have decreased by as much as 15%. Moreover, the risk premiums almost
remain the same. This illustrates the diﬀerent roles of noisy supply and information in
determining volatility and risk premiums. Therefore, these unique features of our model
are not at the expense of increased noisy supply, which would be implausible in reality.
Insert Table 2
5 Trading volume
Trading volume is an important ﬁnancial variable for practitioners. In most of the theo-
retical work, however, trading volume is neglected either because it plays no signiﬁcant
role under symmetric information structure, or due to diﬃculties in reconciling model
implications with the large trading volume observed in reality. In a model with a fully
revealing equilibrium, prices will be a suﬃcient statistics for all the private information.
In other words, volume would convey no additional information. However, in a model
with non-fully revealing equilibrium (typically with noisy supply), trading volume could
reveal additional information to rational agents. In this case, equilibrium prices may
reﬂect a market evaluation of new information, while trading volume summarizes the
diﬀerences in information among agents. In order to avoid complications in solving the
rational expectations equilibrium in our multi-asset model, we study trading volume
from an ex post point of view19. In other words, we assume that trading volume is
unobservable ex ante as is common in the literature.
There have been many empirical studies on trading volume which are best sum-
marized in Karpoﬀ (1987). Aside from the time series properties of trading volume
such as the declining daily return autocorrelation with volume (see Campbell, Gross-
man, and Wang (1993)), the most signiﬁcant and interesting result is the price-volume
relationship. This is the main concern in this section. Although trading volume is a
dynamic concept, one can use an alternative deﬁnition by comparing the demand with
some bases. Since the focus of this paper is on the informational eﬀect, we choose the
base to be the demand without noisy supply (or signals about payoﬀs). In this case
19From ex ante point of view, when tradingvolume contains additional information, it should be
included in an investor’s information set.
25the demand from the ﬁrst group (D0
a) and the second group (D0
b) agents will simply
be 1
2
¯ Z, and the equilibrium price vector can be written as P 0 = 1
R[ ¯ F − 1
τ(VG + VH) ¯ Z].
Therefore, trading volume for investor a and b can be deﬁned as Υa = |Da( ˜ Xa, ˜ P)−D0
a|
and Υb = |Db( ˜ Xb, ˜ P) − D0
b|, respectively. This deﬁnition can be rationalized in a two
period world. In the ﬁrst period there is no private information with ﬁxed supply. Then
there comes the noisy traders in the second period, and investors begin to collect infor-
mation. Under this interpretation, the average trading volume can also be deﬁned in
the following way,
Υ = lim
N→∞
1
2N
[
 
a
Υa +
 
b
Υb]=E[Υa( ˜ Xa, ˜ P)] + E[Υb( ˜ Xb, ˜ P)]. (14)
It is diﬃcult to write down the explicit form of equation (14) due to the expectation of
a vector of absolute value functions. We can focus on the trading volume of a particular
asset, say the k−th, which can be written as Υk = E[| α 
a[k]εG,a+βa[k] |]+E[| α 
b[k]εH,b+
βb[k] |], where εG,a (or εH,b) is an agent’s n × 1 vector of signal noises, α[.] is a vector of
constant, and β[.] is a function of prices. In order to gain intuitions, let us ﬁrst compute
as i m p l ef o r mo fΥ ( β)=E[| α x+β |]w i t hx ∼ N(0,Σ). The following relationship can
thus be established,
Υ(β)=
 
···
 
| α
 x + β | N(0,Σ)dx1 ···dxn =
 
| u + β | N(0,σ)du
= σ{
 
2
π
e
− 1
2(
β
σ)2
+
β
σ
[1 − 2Φ(−
β
σ
)]} , (15)
where Φ(.) is the cumulative probability of a standard normal distribution and σ =
α Σα.S i n c eβ is a function of prices and Υ(β) is symmetric about β, the price volume
implications can be analyzed using a comparative static approach, i.e., by examining
the partial derivative of the following form,
∂Υ(β)
∂∆pi
=[ 1− 2Φ(−
β
σ
)]
∂β
∂∆pi
. (16)
Clearly, if β is monotonic in ∆pi, the above partial derivative will be negative when
β/σ is negative and positive when β/σ is positive. This means that Υ is a nonlinear
function of price changes with a positive correlation between Υ and absolute price change
in general. Particularly, if Υ represents the trading volume with
β
σ = a + b∆pi, we will
have a check shape relationship between volume and price in the case of positive a and
b as displayed in Figure 1. This relationship is consistent with many empirical ﬁndings.
26First, trading volume and price changes appear to have a nonlinear asymmetric rela-
tionship, and the degree of asymmetry increases with a. This asymmetric relationship
suggests that volume tends to be larger when price increases than when price decreases.
Secondly, volume will be positively correlated with an absolute change in price. Thirdly,
if we ﬁt a linear regression line to the price-volume pair, the slope coeﬃcient will be pos-
itive. Yet, the residuals from such a regression will be heteroscedastic. And ﬁnally, when
price changes are in a relatively small range, the positive relationship between price and
volume will be close to linear. In the case where a = 0, we will only be able to observe
a positive relationship between trading volume and absolute price change. When a<0,
however, all the observations will be reversed except the positive relationship between
trading volume and absolute price change.
Insert Figure 1
These observations can be further tied to the structure of our model. In order
to understand the mechanism that generates these results, we should focus on the case
where information is equalized across the two groups of agents. For simplicity, we further
assume here that the volatilities of the signal noises within each group are symmetric,
i.e., SG,a = SG, SH,b = SH, and assume τa = τb = 1
2τ. Under these simpliﬁcation
assumptions we have τaVa = V1, τbVb = V2, τaΛa =Λ 1, τbΛb =Λ 2,a n dτaΓa = τbΓb =Γ .
With some algebraic manipulations on equations (9) and (10), the demand functions for
each group of agents as well as price changes can then be rewritten as,
Υa =
1
2
|ΘΩ¯ Z − (I + ΘΩΞ)(Γ∆ ˜ F − ∆ ˜ Z)+2 Γ ∆˜ G +2 Γ εG,a| (17)
Υb =
1
2
|−ΘΩ ¯ Z − (I − ΘΩΞ)(Γ∆ ˜ F − ∆ ˜ Z)+2 Γ ∆˜ G +2 Γ εH,b| (18)
˜ P − P
0 =
1
R
(Ω0 − Ω) ¯ Z +
1
R
ΩΞ(Γ∆ ˜ F − ∆ ˜ Z) (19)
where Θ = Λ1V
−1
G −Λ2V
−1
H ,Ξ=I +τΓ V
−1
Z ,a n dΩ 0 = 1
τ(VG +VH) is the risk premium
per unit supply for the base model. Note that Θ = 0 whenever SG = SH, which could
further simplify our analysis. Since changes in prices are either due to changes in the
fundamentals or changes in the supply of assets, we discuss the trading volume case by
case.
27Case I : volume due to changes in fundamentals (∆ ˜ G or ∆ ˜ H)
Since changes in ∆ ˜ G or ∆ ˜ H have symmetric eﬀect on the price changes as well as the
trading volume, we concentrate our discussion on changes in the ﬁrst fundamental in
this section, i.e., ∆ ˜ G. When a price change is solely due to a change in a fundamental,
we can substitute equation (19) into equations (17) and (18) to yield,
Υa = |ΓεG,a − (Γ∆ ˜ H − ∆ ˜ Z)+
1
2
Π¯ Z +
R
2
(Ξ
−1Ω
−1 − Θ)( ˜ P − P
0)|, (20)
Υb = |−ΓεH,b − Γ∆ ˜ H +
1
2
Π ¯ Z +
R
2
(Ξ
−1Ω
−1 − Θ)( ˜ P − P
0)|, (21)
where, Π = ΘΩ0 +Ξ −1Ω−1(Ω − Ω0). Rewriting them in terms of β in equation (15),
we have β ∝ (Ω − Ω0) ¯ Z + RΩ−1( ˜ P − P 0)w h e nSG = SH. As discussed in the previous
section, our model produces much higher risk premia (Ω) than that of the base model
(Ω0). Together with the properties about Υ(β) in equation (16), we know that the
trading volume from both groups will likely have a check shape relation with price
change. In other words, we have an asymmetric response of trading volume to price
changes. This is only possible in the structure of our model.
When the ﬁrst fundamental is looking strong, ∆ ˜ G will be high, which means the ﬁrst
group of investors will receive good news ˜ Xa. Demand from the ﬁrst group will thus be
strong. At the same time, since there are no changes in both the second fundamental and
the noisy supply, it is very unlikely that there will be any co-movement between prices
and private signals from the second group of investors. From an information perspective,
the second group of investors will demand less risky assets since they consider themselves
to possess relatively inferior information. The overall high prices due to the ﬁrst funda-
mental will further reduce demand from the second group. The total trading volumes
will be relatively high when prices are high. Similarly, when the ﬁrst fundamental is
weak, signals received by the ﬁrst group of investors will be low, which in turn decreases
demand from the ﬁrst group. The falling prices due to the ﬁrst fundamental will induce
demand from the second group. However, from an information perspective, the degree
of increase in demand will not be as large as before for the same reason. In other words,
some of the substitution eﬀect of demand will be oﬀset by the informational eﬀect, which
prevents demand from the second group of investors being too high. The total trading
volume will be high but not as strong as that in the ﬁrst case. In summary, there will
be an asymmetric response of trading volume to price changes. This phenomenon is
28not due to the “no short sale restriction” of Copeland (1976) and Jennings, Starks, and
Fellingham (1981), rather it is because of the incomplete information structure.
In contrast, it is very diﬃcult to study trading volume implications in a conventional
model when the driving force is the fundamental. For example, Admati (1985)’s model
predicts a zero correlation between trading volume and price changes under the same
deﬁnition of trading volume. Even for models with trading volume implications, only
a symmetric relationship between trading volume and price changes is possible. More-
over, our model is potentially useful in explaining large trading volume. Note that the
existence of trading volume in this case is because of the trading activity between the
two groups rather than changes in the exogenous supply.
Case II : volume due to exogenous supply (∆ ˜ Z)
Similarly we can express the trading volume in the following forms when the only driving
force is the noisy supply,
Υa = |−ΓεG,a − Γ∆ ˜ G +
1
2
Π ¯ Z +
R
2
(Ξ
−1Ω
−1 +Θ ) (˜ P − P
0)| (22)
Υb = |−ΓεH,b − Γ∆ ˜ H +
1
2
Π ¯ Z +
R
2
(Ξ
−1Ω
−1 − Θ)( ˜ P − P
0)|. (23)
It is clear that we will likely observe a check shape price-volume relationship by ex-
amining the above two equations. However the mechanism is a little diﬀerent. Since
neither of the fundamental changes in this case, trading volume will mostly come from
changes in noisy supply20. When there is a substantial increase (decrease) in the noisy
supply, prices will drop (rise) while demand increases (decreases), i.e., a negative (posi-
tive) relationship between volume and price changes. However, price changes tend to be
more negative relative to the base case. This is because of the additional risk premium
attributed to an incomplete information structure. In other words, for the same amount
of trading volume, price changes will be more negative when noisy supply increases than
what will happen when it decreases. We, thus, tend to observe a non-linear, asymmetric
price-volume relationship.
From these two cases, we can conclude that no matter whether price changes are
due to innovations in the fundamentals or in the noisy supply, volume and price change
20Tradingvolume will only come from noisy supply if SG = SH.
29tend to have a check shape relationship, which is consistent with empirical ﬁndings as
discussed at the beginning of this section. When price changes are related to both noisy
supply and fundamentals, the eﬀect should be even stronger than the individual cases.
The degree of asymmetry depends on the coeﬃcient matrix Ξ−1, which is proportional to
Γ−1 and VZ. Intuitively, the more information agents possess or the lower the volatility
of supply noises, the easier for agents to correctly understand why price changes. The re-
sponses of trading volume to price changes largely depends on the information structure.
When there is an improvement in the informational content (Γ) or the completeness of
signals (Λ1 or Λ2), agents tend to trade more aggressively, which corresponds to an even
large trading volume. Therefore, the incomplete informational structure plays an impor-
tant role in understanding the volume predictions. These properties are very diﬃcult if
not impossible to observe in a conventional asymmetric information model.
The multi-asset framework also plays an important role in volume. Volume comes
from two sources, absorbing noisy supply and trading between the two groups. Al-
though noisy supply is crucial in preventing equilibrium price from fully revealing, it
cannot create a realistic trading volume. Instead, trading between the two groups due
to incomplete information and within the group due to asymmetric information become
vital. The multi-asset framework, together with the incomplete information structure,
provides an opportunity to create the observed large trading volume. For example, as
discussed earlier, one group of investors can view an asset as a Giﬀen good while others
treat the same asset as a normal good. Trading volume can thus be very large.
6 Conclusions
In a multi-asset economy, we have built a rational expectations equilibrium model with
incomplete information structure. This model does not require exogenous informational
advantages as is often assumed in the asymmetric information literature. Instead, diﬀer-
ent group of investors receives signals about diﬀerent fundamentals. Such an information
structure allows us to derive many unique results in addition to the conventional ones.
This suggests that the incompleteness of information aﬀect asset prices in an important
way. In general, asset prices are less dependent on their fundamentals and more closely
related to exogenous supply. In other words, the correlation between fundamentals and
30prices could be rather low. It is not to say, however, we need an implausibly large
noisy supply to guarantee the results. In fact, noisy supply could be made much smaller
than that in an informed and uninformed trader’s model. The multi-asset setting of our
model is also essential. Many interesting features could not be obtained without the
interaction between diﬀerent assets. For example, increases in asset prices should not
necessarily be associated with increases in their payoﬀs. This is useful in understanding
why good news about earnings of a stock does not always translate into a high stock
price. One can also ﬁnd in our model that diﬀerent investors sometimes view the same
asset fundamentally diﬀerently; some may consider an asset as a normal good while
others may rationally view it as a Giﬀen good. Moreover, equilibrium prices depend on
each fundamental of the same asset diﬀerently. In other words, even without changes in
the overall fundamentals or noisy supply, prices could vary a lot. The marginal eﬀect
of each fundamental, however, not only depends on the riskness but also is determined
by the degree of incomplete information. Together with the ampliﬁed exogenous supply
eﬀect from the incomplete information structure, this model generates high-level price
volatility with a potentially high risk premium.
Perhaps what is most appealing is that our model predicts a check shape relationship
between price changes and trading volume, which is consistent with commonly cited
empirical evidence. Our model thus oﬀers a diﬀerent perspective to understand the
trading volume. Furthermore, the trading volume generated in our model is not a direct
consequence of noisy supply as is common in the past literature. Rather it is due to the
trading activity among diﬀerent group of investors.
Our model also yields an indirectly testable implication. Note that when the in-
completeness of information is worsening, the price volatility will be high, while the
correlation between price and earnings should be low. Therefore, we can test to see if a
high volatility episode corresponds to the period when the price and earning correlations
are low.
Appendix A
This part proves Theorem 2. It is essentially a constructive proof. Given the joint normal
distribution assumption, the conditional expectation for the payoﬀs to fundamentals are a
31linear function of the information set in the followingforms:
E( ˜ F| ˜ Xa, ˜ P)=B0a + B1a ˜ Xa + B2a ˜ P, (24)
E( ˜ F|˜ Yb, ˜ P)=B0b + B1b˜ Yb + B2b ˜ P, (25)
where the coeﬃcient matrices B0a, B1a, B2a, B0b, B1b,a n dB2b are the best linear projection
matrices, and can be obtained by an OLS approach. With the given utility function, it can
be shown that the demand functions for agent a and agent b are,
Da( ˜ Xa, ˜ P)=τaVa
−1[B0a + B1a ˜ Xa +( B2a − RI) ˜ P] and (26)
Db(˜ Yb, ˜ P)=τbVb
−1[B0b + B1b ˜ Yb +( B2b − RI) ˜ P] (27)
where Va (= Va r( ˜ F| ˜ Xa, ˜ P)) and Vb (= Va r( ˜ F|˜ Yb, ˜ P)) are the variance-covariance matrices
conditioned on agent a’s and agent b’s information sets respectively. These matrices are con-
stant, independent of the realization of signals and fundamentals. In equilibrium, every market
should clear, which leads to the followingcondition
  1
0
Dada +
  1
0
Dbdb = ˜ Z. (28)
Solving ˜ Z from equation (5) and substitutingit into above equation, we have the following
conditions,
A3
−1A0 =
  1
0
τaVa
−1B0ada +
  1
0
τbVb
−1B0bdb, (29)
A3
−1A1 =
  1
0
τaVa
−1B1ada, (30)
A3
−1A2 =
  1
0
τbVb
−1B1bdb, and (31)
−A3
−1 =
  1
0
τaVa
−1(B2a − RI)da +
  1
0
τbVb
−1(B2b − RI)db. (32)
Because of the symmetry involved, we only derive the coeﬃcient matrices B0a, B1a, B2a,a n d
the variance-covariance matrix Va below. With the assumptions about the structure of the
triple ( ˜ F, ˜ Xa, ˜ P), we can write their variance-covariance matrix as,
Wa( ˜ F, ˜ Xa, ˜ P) ≡


 

VG + VH VG VGA1
  + VHA2
 
VG VG + SG,a VGA1
 
A1VG + A2VH A1VG A1VGA1
  + A2VHA2
  + A3VZA3
 


 

. (33)
By an OLS argument, we can write the following simultaneous equations according to the
above variance-covariance matrix,

   
   
B1a(VG + SG,a)+B2aA1VG = VG,
B1aVGA1
  + B2a(A1VGA1
  + A2VHA2
  + A3VZA3
 )=VGA1
  + VHA2
 ,a n d
Va = VG + VH − B1aVG − B2a(A1VG + A2VH).
(34)
32Letting La
−1 = A1QG,aA1
  + A2VHA2
  + A3VZA3
  and assuming A1, A2,a n dA3 are known,
the above equations can be simpliﬁed to the followingform:

   
   
B1a =( QG,a − QG,aA1
 LaA1QG,a − VHA2
 LaA1QG,a)SG,a
−1,
B2a =( QG,aA1
  + VHA2
 )La,
Va = QG,a + VH − (QG,aA1
  + VHA2
 )La(A1QG,a + A2VH).
(35)
Similar, if we let Lb
−1 = A2QH,bA2
  + A1VGA1
  + A3VZA3
 , the followingequations can be
obtained in the same manner:

   
   
B1b =( QH,b − QH,bA2
 LbA2QH,b − VGA1
 LbA2QH,b)SH,b
−1,
B2b =( QH,bA2
  + VGA1
 )Lb,
Vb = QH,b + VG − (QH,bA2
  + VGA1
 )Lb(A2QH,b + A1VG).
(36)
In equations (35) and (36), coeﬃcient matrices A1, A2,a n dA3 are still unknown, and should
be solved by substitutingequations (35) and (36) back into equation (30), (31) and (32).
Yet, they are highly non-linear and involve more than solving an Algebraic Ricatti Equation.
Fortunately, we can deal with a special case.
Suppose A1 = A2 and denote M ≡ A1
−1A3,w ec a nw r i t eLa
−1 = A1(QG,a + VH +
MVZM )A1
  and Lb
−1 = A1(QH,b+VG +MVZM )A1
 . Therefore, the followingequations can
be obtained,

   
   
B1a = VaV −1
H (SG,a
−1 + V −1
G + V −1
H )−1SG,a
−1,
B2a = Va(MVZM )−1A1
−1,
Va =[ ( QG,a + VH)−1 +( MVZM )−1]−1.
(37)

   
   
B1b = VbV −1
G (SH,b
−1 + V −1
G + V −1
H )−1SH,b
−1,
B2b = Vb(MVZM )−1A2
−1,
Vb =[ ( QH,b + VG)−1 +( MVZM )−1]−1.
(38)
When substitutingthese equations back into equation (30) and (31), we see that the condition
for A1 = A2 to be true is that the followingrelationship holds:
  1
0
τaV −1
H (V −1
G + V −1
H + SG,a
−1)−1SG,a
−1da =
  1
0
τbV −1
G (V −1
G + V −1
H + SH,b
−1)−1SH,b
−1db. (39)
Note that V −1
H (V −1
G + V −1
H + SG,a
−1)−1SG,a
−1 =( VG + VH)−1[VH(VG + VH)−1 + SG,aV −1
G ]−1
=Γ a. The above condition is exactly the same as the condition given in the theorem. This
relationship together with equation (30) suggests that M =Γ −1.S i n c e ( QG,a + VH)−1 =
(QG,a +VH)−1QG,aSG,a
−1 +( QG,a +VH)−1QG,aV −1
G , it is easy to integrate over the inverse of
Va and Vb,
  1
0
τaVa
−1 =Γ+Λ 1V −1
G + τ1Γ V −1
Z Γ, (40)
33  1
0
τbVb
−1 =Γ+Λ 2V −1
H + τ2Γ V −1
Z Γ. (41)
This leads to a solution to A1. Speciﬁcally, since by deﬁnition A3
−1 =Γ A1
−1, equation (32)
can be rewritten as
ΓA1
−1 = R
  1
0
τaVa
−1da + R
  1
0
τbVb
−1db − (42)
(
  1
0
τaΓ V −1
Z Γda +
  1
0
τbΓ V −1
Z Γdb)A1
−1; or
A1 =
1
R
(
  1
0
τaVa
−1da +
  1
0
τbVb
−1db)−1(Γ + τΓ V −1
Z Γ). (43)
After substitutingin equation (40) and (41), we can derive the expression for A1 (=A2)a n d
A3 as in the theorem. In order to solve for A0, we ﬁrst need to express B0a and B0b in the
followingform:
B0a = ¯ G + ¯ H − B1a ¯ G − B2a(A0 + A1 ¯ G + A2 ¯ H − A3 ¯ Z) and (44)
B0b = ¯ G + ¯ H − B1b ¯ H − B2b(A0 + A1 ¯ G + A2 ¯ H − A3 ¯ Z). (45)
Equations (44) and (45) can be substituted into equation (29). Usingthe fact A1 = A2 and
A3
−1 =Γ A1
−1, it can be further simpliﬁed as
(Γ + τΓ V −1
Z Γ)A1
−1A0 =( Γ+Λ 1V −1
G +Λ 2V −1
H )( ¯ G + ¯ H)+τΓ V −1
Z ¯ Z. (46)
By the same technique, we can solve for B0a as
B0a = ¯ G + ¯ H − VaΓa ¯ G − VaΓ V −1
Z ΓA1
−1(A0 + A1 ¯ G + A2 ¯ H − A3 ¯ Z)
= Va{[(QG,a + VH)−1 +Γ  V −1
Z Γ]( ¯ G + ¯ H) − Γa ¯ G − Γ V −1
Z Γ
[(Γ + τΓ V −1
Z Γ)−1((Γ + Λ1V −1
G +Λ 2V −1
H )( ¯ G + ¯ H)+τΓ V −1
Z ¯ Z)+ ¯ F − Γ−1 ¯ Z]}
= Va{(Γa ¯ H +Λ aV −1
G ¯ F) − (VZΓ −1 + τ)−1[(Γ + Λ1V −1
G +Λ 2V −1
H ) ¯ F − ¯ Z]}
In a similar fashion, we can also derive the expression for B0b as,
B0b = Vb{(Γb ¯ G +Λ bV −1
H ¯ F) − (VZΓ −1 + τ)−1[(Γ + Λ1V −1
G +Λ 2V −1
H ) ¯ F − ¯ Z]}
Q.E.D.
Appendix B
This part proves Theorem 3. Takingan unconditional expectation to the equilibrium condition,
we have the followingrelationship,
  1
0
E(Da)da +
  1
0
E(Db)db = ¯ Z. (47)
34Since the demand functions for both groups of agents have the same functional form as equa-
tions (26) and (27), the expected demand can be expressed as
E(Da)=τaVa
−1[B0a + B1a ¯ G + B2a(A0 + A1 ¯ G + A2 ¯ H − A3 ¯ Z) − RE( ˜ P)] and (48)
E(Db)=τbVb
−1[B0b + B1b ¯ H + B2b(A0 + A1 ¯ G + A2 ¯ H − A3 ¯ Z) − RE( ˜ P)]. (49)
Substitutingequations (44) and (45) into equations (48) and (49) the expected demand can
be further simpliﬁed to
E(Da)=τaVa
−1[ ¯ G + ¯ H − RE( ˜ P)] and (50)
E(Db)=τbVb
−1[ ¯ G + ¯ H − RE( ˜ P)]. (51)
Therefore, the theorem can be shown by substitutingequations (50) and (51) into equation
(47). Q.E.D.
Appendix C
This part shows the two-step procedure in solving for the equilibrium prices. First, from
equation (30), (31), (35) and (36) in Appendix A, we can write the following nonlinear
matrix simultaneous equations:

      
      
Va = τa[QG,a − (QG,a + VHT  )(QG,a + TV HT   + MVZM )−1QG,a]SG,a
−1M,
Vb = τb[QH,b − (QH,bT   + VG)(TQ H,bT   + VG + MVZM )−1TQ H,b]SH,b
−1T −1M,
Va = QG,a + VH − (QG,a + VHT  )(QG,a + TV HT   + MVZM )−1(QG,a + TV H),
Vb = QH,b + VG − (QG,aT   + VG)(TQ H,bT   + VG + MVZM )−1(TQ H,b + VG),
(52)
where T = A1
−1A2 and M = A1
−1A3. We can then solve for the numerical value of
matrices M, T, Va and Vb. In the second step, we solve for A1 directly applying equations
(32), (35), and (36) in Appendix A, i.e.,
A1 =
1
R
(τaVa
−1 + τbVb
−1)
−1[M
−1 + τaVa
−1(QG,a + VHT
 )(QG,a + TV HT
  (53)
+MVZM
 )
−1 + τbVb
−1(QG,aT
  + VG)(TQ H,bT
  + VG + MVZM
 )
−1].
Accordingly, A2 and A3 can be calculated from A2 = A1T and A3 = A1M. Matrix
T is important in measuring the relative importance of the two fundamentals in the
equilibrium price vector.
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37Table 1: Numerical Results for Price, Inference, and Demand Function
v(1,2) A1 = A2 A3 Ba1 = Bb1 Ba2 = Bb2 Ca1 = Cb1 Ca2 = Cb2
5.0 -0.305 0.167 -0.040 1.580 0.076 0.142 -2.660 0.548 0.949 -0.169 5.640 -1.040
-2.100 0.984 -0.695 8.520 0.219 0.741 -17.30 3.570 -0.169 0.102 0.460 -0.026
4.8 -0.088 0.114 0.142 1.390 0.141 0.137 -0.519 0.118 0.919 -0.157 2.280 -0.380
-1.740 0.892 -0.464 8.320 0.317 0.741 -6.560 1.420 -0.157 0.098 0.127 0.039
4.5 0.100 0.069 0.305 1.180 0.199 0.130 0.032 .0017 0.878 -0.141 1.440 -0.208
-1.420 0.811 -0.299 8.170 0.398 0.743 -3.850 0.867 -0.141 0.094 0.053 0.054
4.0 0.265 0.029 0.455 0.936 0.253 0.120 0.293 -0.054 0.824 -0.118 1.040 -0.121
-1.130 0.736 -0.225 8.040 0.462 0.747 -2.600 0.595 -0.118 0.088 0.029 0.059
3.0 0.404 -0.004 0.601 0.551 0.302 0.103 0.450 -0.081 0.747 -0.080 0.802 -0.055
-0.883 0.664 -0.329 7.980 0.501 0.759 -1.890 0.418 -0.080 0.080 0.033 0.060
Table 2: Numerical Results Under an Unequalized Information Structure
Results for the original structure
T M Γ1 Γ2 Λ1 Λ2
.561 -.208 2.58 -.701 .410 .066 .198 -.047 .416 .107 .203 - .067
-.188 .824 -.522 4.82 .046 .218 -.022 .161 .068 .222 -.038 .163
Corr( ˜ P, ˜ G) Corr( ˜ P, ˜ H) Corr( ˜ P, ˜ Z) Va r ( ˜ P) Va r ( ˜ PF) Ω
.372 .126 .151 -.087 -.912 .139 3.35 -.617 .558 .196 .881 - .093
.096 .326 -.077 .221 .120 -.918 -.617 9.94 .196 1.56 -.093 1.87
Results for the case of 1
4VZ
T M Γ1 Γ2 Λ1 Λ2
.573 -.199 2.60 -.682 .410 .066 .198 -.047 .416 .107 .203 - .067
-.182 .833 -.516 4.84 .046 .218 -.022 .161 .068 .222 -.038 .163
Corr( ˜ P, ˜ G) Corr( ˜ P, ˜ H) Corr( ˜ P, ˜ Z) Va r ( ˜ P) Va r ( ˜ PF) Ω
.415 .140 .171 -.094 -.889 .133 2.90 -.420 .605 .213 .854 - .099
.109 .366 -.085 .251 .114 -.895 -.420 8.40 .213 1.67 -.099 1.81
Results for the case of 2SG,a
T M Γ1 Γ2 Λ1 Λ2
.835 -.319 4.06 -.941 .252 .040 .198 -.047 .512 .131 .203 - .067
-.240 1.07 -.547 6.49 .022 .157 -.022 .161 .076 .318 -.038 .163
Corr( ˜ P, ˜ G) Corr( ˜ P, ˜ H) Corr( ˜ P, ˜ Z) Va r ( ˜ P) Va r ( ˜ PF) Ω
.249 .092 .149 -.087 -.955 .108 3.58 -.537 .317 .048 1.03 - .032
.068 .247 -.077 .220 .101 -.943 -.537 10.7 .048 1.18 -.032 2.07
38